Sumber : Istimewa
THE Investment Management Agency (BPI) Dan antara continues to attract the attention of both global and domestic investors. After a year of taking over the management of state-owned en terprises (SOEs), the public is eagerly awaiting Danantara’s financial reports. People want to know if Danantara is showing signs that it can make President Prabowo Subian to’s grand vision for the agency come true. Upon its launch in February 2025, Prabowo expressed his belief that Danantara could serve as a strategic solution to opti mize SOE performance, enabling them to transform into world-class leaders in their respective sectors. Further more, Danantara is touted to become the world’s largest Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF).
The road to realizing that dream remains long. This is especially true given that Danantara’s first year has fo cused primarily on consolidation and restructuring. The SOE sector is rife with state-owned companies posting dis mal financial results and burdened by massive debt. On various occasions, Dony Oskaria, Danantara’s Chief Oper ating Officer (COO), has revealed instances of financial en gineering within several SOEs.
Yet, after one year of operation, Danantara appears to have brought SOEs to a crossroads. The public is waiting to see whether Danantara will steer SOEs to become reli able market players driven by commercial profit, or posi tion them to execute government development projects. Danantara’s status is clearly defined in Law No. 1 of 2025 concerning Regional-Owned Enterprises (BUMD). It is des ignated as an independent body under the President, tasked with managing government investments and State Owned Enterprise (BUMN) assets professionally, transpar ently, and accountably to support the Asta Cita agenda, ac celerate industrialization, drive economic growth, and enhance Indonesia’s global competitiveness.
This means BUMNs will serve as the engine for realiz ing the President’s mission as outlined in Asta Cita. This role is particularly crucial given the government’s dilem ma amidst fiscal pressures. The State Budget (APBN) is burdened by a mountain of debt that reached Rp 10,293 trillion as of June 2026. In 2027, the Indonesian govern ment is projected to pay Rp 650.31 trillion in debt interest. It is 11.7 percent increase over the projected interest pay ment of Rp 582.24 trillion for 2026. Meanwhile, President Prabowo remains adamant about implementing populist programs such as the Free Nutritious Meals (MBG) initia tive which will consume Rp 268 trillion of the budget in 2026 and the establishment of 80,000 Koperasi Merah Pu tih (KMP)/ The Red-White Cooperatives units, requiring Rp 240 trillion in funding.
Consequently, rather than propelling state-owned en terprises (SOEs) to become players on the global stage, Da nantara finds itself preoccupied with assisting the govern ment in executing its programs. In fact, under the legal framework of the Law on the Development and Strength ening of the Financial Sector (an amendment passed on June 4, 2026), Danantara is empowered to issue instru ments ranging from “Patriot Bond” to “Merah Putih Bond” while disregarding the source of the funds. Article 50A, Paragraph 5, stipulates that the State guarantees and pro tects the purchase of these special debt instruments, shielding them from general prosecution, special criminal proceedings (including tax-related matters), and civil law suits.
Thus, once again, the grand vision for these corpora tions is thwarted by political interests, resulting in SOEs being constantly burdened with state mandates. When fi nancial difficulties arise, the state assumes the burden; SOEs have been caught in this trap since 2015. A similar dynamic played out during the Joko Widodo administra tion’s ambitious infrastructure drive, which compelled state-owned construction firms to finance projects by rais ing debt in the market. Ultimately, these construction SOEs suffered massive financial haemorrhaging and remain in the process of restructuring to this day.
According to data from The Asian Post Research, these state-owned construction firms continue to incur stagger inglosses and suffer from critically weak solvency, with debt-to-asset ratios (DAR) exceeding 90%. In 2025, Waskita Karya posted a loss of Rp 4.48 trillion (DAR: 94.81%); Wijaya Karya lost Rp 10.13 trillion (DAR: 96.64%); Pembangu nan Perumahan lost Rp 7.99 trillion (DAR: 89.98%); Adhi Karya lost Rp 5.59 trillion (DAR: 88.55%); and Perum Perumnas lost Rp 371 billion (DAR: 86.51%). Meanwhile, Kereta Api Indonesia (KAI) escaped the “Whoosh” debt trap due to its position as the holder of an 85% stake in KCIC, the entity behind the high-speed rail project.
This year, KCIC’s debt burden of Rp 120 trillion was ultimately assumed by the Ministry of Finance through a Special Mission Vehicle (SMV). Similarly, Agrinas Pangan Nusantara incurred Rp 240 trillion in debt from state-owned banks to establish 80,000 Koperasi Merah Putih (KMP), which cost in average of Rp 3 billion per unit. Repayments on these loans are set to begin on September 25, 2026, with an initial instalment of Rp 37.7 trillion covering both principal and interest. Given that the loan proceeds were used to construct physical KMP facilities that have yet to generate any revenue, it is impossible for Agrinas to service the debt. However, to prevent these loans from becoming non-performing loans (NPLs) at the state-owned banking group (Himbara), the state stepped in to assume the obligation. When contacted by Infobank, Frans Sahli of the Minis try of Finance’s Directorate General of Fiscal Balance confirmed the matter.
He stated that the government guarantees instalment payments for physical construction costs by channelling the General Allocation Fund (DAU) or Revenue Shar ing Fund (DBH) for Koperasi Keluarga Merah Putih (KKMP), and Village Funds for Koperasi Desa Merah Putih (KDMP). “In accordance with Minister of Finance Regulation (PMK) 15/2026, instalment payments will be made fol lowing the handover of work and a review by the BPKP or APIP. The disbursement of DAU/DBH or Village Funds to settle all obligations arising from the accelerated physical construction of outlets, warehouses, and KMP/KDMP facilities is conducted based on principles of transparency, accountability, prudence, and performance-based management,” he said. A banker at a state-owned bank noted that credit discipline and risk management practices weaken when commercial risks are effectively shift ed to the public budget, particularly given the uncertain success rate of the KDMP program.
Moreover, the funds identified for meeting upcoming installment payments amount to only around Rp 8.1 trillion. This leaves a shortfall of approximately Rp 29.6 trillion; if such a gap persists annually, it could lead to the emergence of non-performing loans. Consequently, directives from “the above” to extend credit to government programs, such as the KDMP, are causing bankers at state-owned banks to have sleep deprivations because of thinking about the problems. Bank Mandiri found itself in an unfortunate position when it received an order to freeze the account of Supriyono alias Botok, who held a balance of Rp 89.09 million. The freeze, executed on August 21, 2026, at the “behest” of the Jakarta Metro Police, was perceived by the public as a state attempt to cut off the financial resources of a key figure from the Unit ed Pati Community Alliance (AMPB), a group preparing to stage a protest in Jakarta on August 27, 2026. As an institution built on trust, the freezing of a customer’s account tarnished the state-owned bank’s credibility. Short ly thereafter, the public heavily criticized Bank Mandiri; calls to boycott the bank emerged, and its stock price (BMRI) plummeted. This incident serves as a stark il lustration that state-owned enterprises (BUMN) remain subject to external intervention; the state frequently issues directives without regard for the fact that these companies’ financial performance is heavily market-driven. When facing a crisis, the state often intervenes to save a company, either through capital injections (known as State Capital Participation or PMN) or restructuring to ensure continued operations. A prime example is Garuda Indonesia; despite facing near-collapse three times (in 1968, 1998, and 2021), it remains airborne today. To keep Garuda afloat, the Government injected Rp 7.5 trillion in capital at the end of 2022 and provided a loan of Rp 6.65 trillion last year through Danantara. This stands in stark contrast to private airlines, whose survival is dictated by market forces. Those capable of competing, such as Lion Group, continue to fly. Conversely, those that fail to overcome crises go straight into bankruptcy; examples include Batavia Air, Adam Air, Mandala, and Sriwijaya. They are now nothing more than memories. However, the ease with which they can rely on state funds has left many State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) struggling. According to a study by The Asian Post Research (Rating 160 SOEs 2026), at least four factors contribute to the prevalence of ailing SOEs that require state financial injections.
The first factor is the political factor; SOEs operate at the intersection of the market and politics, often compelled in practice to bow to political and bureaucratic demands. The third factor is mismanagement and a lack of clear strategy, rendering companies unable to compete in the market; expansions are often undertaken without the backing of Good Corporate Governance (GCG) and are marred by weak risk management. The fourth factor is the failure of supervisory functions by boards of commissioners, which are frequently populated by political figures supporting the government or by ministry officials. The Rating of 160 SOEs 2026 evaluates the performance of 161 state owned entities, comprising 68 parent SOEs, 88 SOE subsidiaries, and four state-owned companies under the Ministry of Finance. The results show that only 23 SOEs, 34 SOE subsidiaries, and two state-owned companies under the Ministry of Finance achieved the “Excellent” (Sangat Bagus) rating.
SOEs that failed to secure this rating largely did so because their assets were not generating revenue, leading to depleted cash flow. The research indicates low solvency levels among SOEs, with Debt-to-Asset Ratios (DAR) exceeding 60%; only 23 companies maintained a DAR be low 50%. Meanwhile, 23 SOEs record ed losses, totalling Rp 25.12 trillion. Last year, Pertamina emerged as the largest profit generator, posting Rp 61.79 trillion. It was an increase from the previous year’s profit of Rp 55.71 trillion. Additionally, five state owned banks, namely Bank Mandiri, BRI, Bank Negara Indonesia, Bank Tabungan Negara (BTN), and Bank Syariah Indonesia (BSI), contributed a combined profit of Rp 149.66 tril lion, representing half of the total SOEs profit of Rp 330 trillion announced by Danantara. This profit contribution stems from the success of Himbara (the association of stateowned banks) in implementing good corporate governance (GCG) practices, thereby setting a positive example within the SOEs sector.
Himbara’s dominance in the national banking market is formidable; together with Bank Central Asia (BCA), they have successfully with stood the influx of foreign-owned banks. It would therefore be unfortunate if state-owned banks were forced to yield to political and bureaucratic demands, disregarding their status as financial institutions whose viability depends on market confidence. Experience has shown that politicization and bureaucratization have led to poor outcomes, turning SOEs into state burdens that rely heavily on government capital injections for survival.
The road to realizing that dream remains long. This is especially true given that Danantara’s first year has fo cused primarily on consolidation and restructuring. The SOE sector is rife with state-owned companies posting dis mal financial results and burdened by massive debt. On various occasions, Dony Oskaria, Danantara’s Chief Oper ating Officer (COO), has revealed instances of financial en gineering within several SOEs.
