Sumber : Infobank
THE directors of Indonesia’s state-owned enterprises (BUMN) remain confused. On one hand, they must report to the Danantara Investment Management Agency (BPI Danantara). On the other, they are still beholden to the Ministry of State-Owned Enterprises. This duality has long been a source of frustration. Yet despite the confusion, they continue reporting to both “kings.” The question remains how long this bureaucratic split must persist.
President Prabowo Subianto has tasked Danantara with initiating a structural transformation of BUMN governance, a system he described as irrational. The data presented by Danantara COO Dony Oskaria confirms systemic failure. Of the 1046 entities including subsidiaries, just eight companies contribute 97% of dividends, while 53% operate at a loss, burdening the state budget with up to IDR 50 trillion annually.
This diagnosis is accurate. The problems plaguing Indonesia’s BUMNs such as overlapping functions, inefficiency, and weak competitiveness are indeed severe. The plan to consolidate 1046 entities into 228 scalable and competitive ones, especially in logistics and insurance, is theoretically sound.
Danantara has sought to begin its reforms with efficiency measures including a controversial proposal to eliminate tantiem, or profit-sharing bonuses, for commissioners. According to Oskaria, this could save the state IDR 8 trillion. Plans to cut directors’ bonuses and tantiem are also in the works. For days, this issue echoed loudly in the media almost like a blaring “sound horeg,” meaning empty noise.
But this approach contradicts established corporate governance practices elsewhere. Yet these populist decisions is getting worse, raise legal questions about whether Danantara can avoid being held liable for state financial losses under such a framework.
Originally, Danantara was formed to manage a portion of the nation’s assets to enhance value and support development. Now, it has evolved or perhaps morphed into a “super-holding” company with authority to restructure and even liquidate BUMNs. This is a qualitative leap and a highly risky one.
A fundamental question arises. What legal framework legitimizes Danantara’s dual role as both investment manager and operational authority over BUMNs? Is there not an inherent conflict of interest in overseeing and executing at once? From a macroeconomic standpoint, this blurs the lines between public policy and corporate activity.
More troubling is that since its inception, Danantara has mostly made headline-grabbing announcements about large-scale investments, from aircraft acquisitions and plans to build 17 oil refineries to raising 10 billion dollars, or IDR 160 trillion, in debt. Yet specifics remain sparse.
This level of borrowing is no trivial matter.The critical question is why take on such debt before finalizing a tested investment strategy. Is this debt for productive ventures or merely a fiscal patch?
A telling example is Garuda Indonesia, which received a swift IDR 6,5 trillion injection, while Agrinas Pangan Nusantara, a company focused on food security, continues to struggle. Such prioritization suggests a potentially dangerous policy bias.
All Danantara executives are, at the end of the day, employees not owners. They manage public funds. As such, the principles of good governance including transparency, accountability, and independence must be non-negotiable.
Unfortunately, these principles remain elusive. To this day, the public lacks clarity on three critical fronts.
First, the investment framework. What is Danantara’s business plan? What is its investment policy? Which sectors are targeted, what are the risk limits and return thresholds are expected? None of this is clear.
Second, the decision-making process. Who has the final say in investment approvals? Is it the CEO, CIO, COO, or the Board? Without transparency, power becomes concentrated and conflict of interest becomes inevitable.
Third, accountability and oversight. Who monitors Danantara’s performance? And most importantly, who bears responsibility if investments fail? Are there mechanisms in place for financial, civil, or even criminal liability?
Without strong governance, Danantara could become an investment vehicle even more dangerous than the BUMNs it seeks to reform.
This country has failed too often due to ambition unaccompanied by governance. It must immediately reveal its governance framework, clarify its mandate, and establish an independent accountability system. The public deserves to see a clear roadmap and return projections for 2025 to 2029.
Let us move beyond "omon-omon" or empty talk. What we need is real action, transparency, and responsibility. Danantara must rise above being a loudspeaker for problems. unlike "Malaysian's Danantara". It must take decisive steps unlike anything seen before, to prevent destructiveness from the corruption.
President Prabowo Subianto has tasked Danantara with initiating a structural transformation of BUMN governance, a system he described as irrational. The data presented by Danantara COO Dony Oskaria confirms systemic failure. Of the 1046 entities including subsidiaries, just eight companies contribute 97% of dividends, while 53% operate at a loss, burdening the state budget with up to IDR 50 trillion annually.
